**Compliance and Behavioral Shifts Under Crisis**

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**Abstract.** This study examines the behavioral shifts in beliefs regarding compliance using the Covid-19 pandemic as a case study. A set of social identity variables frames the outline of human behavior. Before the pandemic outbreak, individuals’ perceptions of compliance depended on variables mainly associated with personal characteristics, attitudes toward formal institutions, and political beliefs. In contrast, for 2020, we observe a strong presence of social emotions and informal institutions shaping compliance. These findings indicate that individuals turned to their close social environment to prioritize their existential and economic security. In this case, individuals prefer to rely on informal institutions and social norms rather than political institutions for guidance. We thus conclude that the complex nature of the Covid-19 shock will reshape social values, institutions, and behaviors due to its consequences’ novelty, rapidity, and severity. Regarding policymaking, it is admitted that for attaining higher levels of compliance, the various aspects of human nature shaping lawful behavior should be considered beyond posing sanctions. The accumulated knowledge can be used to design flexible, efficient, and appropriate ‘nudge’ policies contributing to the efficiency and resilience of economies and legal systems. Further research is guided toward examining the relationship between institutional quality, regulation, and social trust.

**Key Words**

Compliance, Social Identity, Shock, Crisis, Behavioral Economics, Principal Components Analysis

**1. Introduction**

Law plays a cardinal role in shaping human behavior and maintaining societal balance and coherence. Since ancient times, legal systems have been crucial for organizing several aspects of personal and social life. For example, Plato in the Republic claims that good laws are essential for the state as they ensure cultural path dependence and that no one is above the law (Plato, 2002). Broadly, law concerns the equal distribution of justice around the public without discriminating the vital parts of the society (Mitnick, 2007). For Aristotle, justice under the notion of compliance with the law –which we examine in this study– is equivalent to the social character within every ethical virtue (Ross, 1995). Hence, laws determine the activities which correspond to the virtues (Ross, 1995).

Laws dictate behavioral patterns and ensure social stability. However, there is an increased level of interconnections between lawful behavior and the structure of the legal system, which depends on prevailing social values, relationships, and whether the system receives a shock (Aoki, 2007). In general, crises challenge institutional saliency and constitute non-optimum equilibria; thus, institutional change emerges (Greif and Laitin, 2004). Compliant behavior is a critical aspect of maintaining a desired behavioral pattern. As a result, it is significant to examine the endogenous fermentations within the economy caused by a crisis in terms of beliefs regarding compliance.

In general, lawful behavior depends on the prevailing social norms and whether they are sticky or adaptive during a crisis (Casoria *et al.*, 2021). Given that institutionalized rules and social norms define an individual’s attitudes, the new institutions emerging after a crisis are the evolution of the previous institutions (Greif and Laitin, 2004) and highly depend on social behaviors and beliefs. Thus, it is of interest to examine how and to what extent the Covid-19 crisis affected the societal beliefs shaping these perceptions. That said, we treat the Covid-19 pandemic as a case study to examine behavioral shifts before and after the crisis.

Social identity formation revolves around personal characteristics and social relationships, generating an appropriate analytical vehicle to trace endogenous change, especially during a shock. Thus, the shift in the determining factors of the beliefs regarding the obligation to always maintain lawful behavior is located through social identity. It is ascertained that some of the traits of the social identity, shaping beliefs for compliance, are synchronic while others are diachronic (Urminsky *et al.*, 2014) and emerge as a response to the crisis.

Our findings suggest that tradition and motive for wealth accumulation positively affect views for compliant behavior regardless the economy is experiencing a shock. However, we observe that the determinants of compliance during the crisis concerned social emotions such as the need to feel secure and exogenous features of social identity such as age. On the other hand, before the Covid-19 shock, the variables shaping compliance are associated with personal emotions, perceptions regarding formal institutions, and political beliefs.

This study analyzes the mechanics of human behavior affecting views on compliance in times of crisis. Thus, our findings are particularly relevant for designing efficient political, economic, and social policies (Hume *et al.*, 2021; Jolls *et al.*, 1998). The accumulated knowledge aims to underline the importance of social relationships and trust for the design of effective and adaptive rules and regulations regardless of the timeline of a shock in the economy.

The remainder of this study is structured under the following sections. Section 2 discusses compliant behavior in times of crisis and the role of institutional saliency. In Section 3, we provide a social identity explanation for lawful behavior. Section 4 presents the methodology and the social identity variables used, while in Section 5, we discuss the findings of our study. Eventually, Section 6 regards the conclusive discussion of our study.

**2. Compliance, Institutions, and Times of Crisis**

Laws aim to pose optimum behavioral patterns and ensure social coherence by making individuals and institutions alter their behavior. As a result, laws constitute efficient solutions for organizing society and are based on the beliefs regarding right and wrong (Jolls *et al.*, 1998). The two main approaches in law and economics concern the neoclassical and the behavioral.

Under the neoclassical approach, the basic behavioral assumption for lawful behavior lies in rationality. Thus, unlawful conducts arise as cost-benefit analysis in terms of sanctions if caught (Jolls *et al.*, 1998). However, individuals may deviate from certain behavioral patterns due to other reasons such as; (a) bounded rationality, (b) bounded willpower, and (c) bounded self-interest (Jolls *et al.*, 1998). Along these lines, an individual may insist on law enforcement due to lacking information and motivation. On the other hand, bounded self-interest means that individuals are not always self-interested, given that the prevailed norms affect their value formation. Thus, if prevailed norms promote fairness and certain laws do not, the individual will act favoring the established norms (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017).

The behavioral economics approach to law considers the complexity of social systems and aims to pose realistic assumptions on human motivation and behaviors (Jolls *et al.*, 1998). The legal system accomplishes its goals directly through fear of sanctions or indirectly by changing attitudes and underlying the morality of certain behaviors (Bliz and Nadler, 2014). Regulation affecting moral attitudes is more efficient than posing threats (Bliz and Nadler, 2014; Tyler, 1997), as moral beliefs are the center of compliant behavior (Paternoster, 1989). Hence, at the microeconomic level, voluntary cooperation and compliance with the law require the factors of morality, legitimacy, and acknowledgment of authority (Tyler, 1997) which may defer from choices based on rationality.

At the macroeconomic level, societal compliance depends on the trustworthiness of the formal institutions. In times of crisis, acknowledgment of authorities and institutional trust are essential for the smooth transition after a shock (Kaasa and Andriani, 2022), as they ensure the acceptance of discretionary policies. Individuals who are confident with the prevailing political institutions demonstrate combined preferences regarding legitimacy. Along these lines, governments have permission to act extralegally when in need of crisis (Corbett, 2012). This approach promotes welfare when the institutions are resilient and democratic.

The above-discussed relationship is based on the fact that the relationships constituting the state are based on legal relationships (Kelsen, 1948) and directly affect policymaking and institutional quality. Thus, any institutional change due to a shock affects the society's rules, organization of values, and behavioral rituals performance. In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic provoked rapid changes resulted in a large behavioral shift as it required high levels of compliance in unprecedented measures at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels (Van Rooij and Sokol, 2021). Prior to the pandemic, the individuals enjoyed social life without being threatened by the imposition of government rules regarding social distancing.

Broadly, the compliance with safety measures during the Covid-19 outbreak was associated with how individuals perceived their need to stay secure from the threat. For some individuals, the realization of the posed threat to human life determined compliance (Six *et al.*, 2021), indicating that the perception of risk was crucial for their behavior. However, individuals who preferred economic security and required social systems to ensure it (Kelsen, 1948) complied with the safety measures when the government issued compensation for their lost income (Bodas and Peleg, 2020).

The above discussion highlights that the government’s approach is crucial for compliant behavior. Furthermore, threatening situations bequeath the state with the obligation to guarantee financial security to achieve the citizens’ compliance with new and unconventional policies (Bodas and Peleg, 2020). Nevertheless, not all individuals share the same perceptions and values. For example, individuals who prefer freedom, because they feel happy only if they are free, will only favor a system which guarantees individual freedom (Kelsen, 1948). Hence, they will not comply with measures restricting their freedom.

Regardless of the consequences of such behavior in the case of the pandemic, this fact leads us to acknowledge that judgments about freedom and economic organization are based on how individuals feel (Kelsen, 1948). In other words, each individual has different perspectives in accordance with the values and standards. These views determine compliance or not with the rules (Hodgson, 2006). It is established that individual and societal views on the legitimacy of a legal system are cardinal for lawful behavior. Thus, it is of interest to examine compliant behavior regarding identity relevant-choices as they entailed cognition and emotion.

**3. Why do people follow some rules and ignore others? A social identity explanation**

Social identity theory suggests that individuals derive their sense of esteem through intergroup relationships (Tajfel, 1978; 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1978; Turner *et al.*, 1994). Thus, self-categories are cognitively composed through comparisons. In this manner, social identity refers to the shared social categories and defines the social-categorical self, which is an individual’s realization of being through group identification (Turner *et al.*, 1994).

Social identity formation is based on personal and social characteristics (Srtyker and Burke, 2000); however, when identities become salient personal influences fade due to depersonalization (Turner *et al.*, 1994). Hence, the concept of social identity becomes stronger when an individual’s opinions depend on the representative beliefs and norms of a social group (Tajfel, 1998; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and eventually affect their motivation and behavior.

In terms of attitudes regarding the law, social identity theory explains why individuals may follow or disobey the rules. Given that individuals seek positive identities, they want to belong to groups that are perceived as moral to validate their self-identity (Ellemers and van de Bos, 2012; Tyler and Lind, 1992). This identification bounds individual behavior per group morals as they want to avoid in-group conflicts and rejection (van Leeuwen *et al.*, 2010). By contrast, if an individual is identified with a group characterized by delinquent behavior, this may result in unlawful behavior and deviations.

As discussed above, another factor influencing lawfulness is the acknowledgment of authority, which, in the case of social identity, requires identification with the authority's values and agenda (Jackson *et al.*, 2012; Tyler and Lind, 1992). Along these lines, the mutual interaction among established groups, social values, and institutions affects societal goal-setting and organization (Gerxhani and van Breemen, 2019).

Institutions are established when they are perceived as moral, legit, fair, and in favor of protecting the salient social identity features. When an institution promotes justice and punishes for fair and proper reasons, individuals are more likely to comply with the institution's rules because they feel safe and consider living in a fair society (Mullen and Nadler, 2008). Otherwise, institutional injustice undermines the individuals' value of morality, resulting in opposition to the imposed laws (Bliz and Nadler, 2014). That said, laws without the individuals’ and social norms’ consensus divide the society leading to social disbalance.

Social values constitute informal dictations of behavioral patterns and rituals as they shape the social identities of individuals (Hitlin and Pinkston, 2013). Lawful behavior, thus, depends on the prevailing social values which shape the social identities of the individuals. Broadly, compliant behavior depends on pro-social and pro-self values that emphasize individual’s improvement within the society (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017; Tao and Au, 2014). However, these two concepts are often conflicted during the social identity formation (Gerxhani and van Breemen, 2019), and only values according to the ethics of the assigned groups influence an individual’s choice to follow the rules.

The dynamics of social relationships and laws for determining lawful behavior are reasonably complex. As a result, this complexity increases when a social system receives a shock, with the response depending on the steepness of the circumstances, the saliency of institutions, social values, and identity features. In times of crisis, different parts of an identity are activated due to the change in individual and societal priorities (Kondo, 1990). In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic the activation of social identities through identity-affirming recommendation for the public health measures, promoted compliance due to clarity of definition in the targeted group identities (Neville *et al.*, 2021).

In general, a perceived threat significantly impacts identity-relevant choices at the individual and societal levels (Yang and Urminsky, 2014). For example, as soon as social activities were prohibited, as a precaution to the Covid-19 spread, individuals considered them as inappropriate (Casoria *et al.*, 2021). However, we should note that the acceptance rate of such measures is connected with the posed threat of the Covid-19 pandemic and the trade-off between security and freedom.

Laws could generate a fast-acting and long-lasting effect on social norms (Casoria et al., 2021) if they are perceived as legitimate and sufficient (Bicchieri, 2017). That said, in terms of social identity theory, dissatisfaction with laws and legal systems, and thus disobedience, arises when these institutions do not evolve parallelly with social values, norms, informal institutions, and salient identity features. An extension of such a situation in times of crisis could shake societal trust in formal institutions, leading individuals to acknowledge other formal and informal systems that embrace their values and identities.

Consequently, the use of social identity for the examination of behavioral shifts provides a multidimensional measure for studying compliance. This fact aligns with the broader purpose of the behavioral approach of law and economics, as the scientist should consider the various factors and their relative influence on behaviors during a crisis (de Puiseau *et al.*, 2019).

**4. Methodology and the Social Identity Variables**

*4.1. Data and Methodology*

For the empirical analysis, we use data collected from field research that was conducted in Greece from 2019 to 2020. The data correspond to answers to a printed questionnaire distributed to Greek society. More specifically, the field research was assigned to a survey bureau member of the European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR), and the Market Research and Public Opinion Companies’ Association (SEDEA).

The sample size is 1600 individuals in total and the choice of the sample was made proportional to the population size sampling. The sample size consisted of adult females and males with sufficient knowledge of the Greek language. For the analysis, we remove the observations with residual characteristics, therefore the total observations account for 1305.

For the empirical analysis, we apply PCA a large data dimensionality reduction method (Hotelling 1933; Joliffe and Cadima, 2016; Kellow, 2006; Pearson 1901) widely employed in social sciences and economics (Keho, 2012), especially when examining phenomena that regard complex behavioral measures (Arguello and Crescenzi, 2019). In general, PCA is an exploratory tool for complex phenomena (Markaki *et al.*, 2014). Regarding the examination of social behaviors, PCA has been applied to reveal representative profiles of social identity (Cassidy *et al.*, 2014; Cinnirella, 1993; Ellemers *et al.*, 1999; Lim and Harell, 2014), political behavior (Markaki *et al.*, 2014), the effects of behavioral measures (Arguello and Crescenzi, 2019), and labor market transitions (Moser, 1984). In particular,

The analysis consists of the following steps. Firstly, we divide the sample size according to year, therefore the year 2019 corresponds to the non-Covid period, while the year 2020 refers to the Covid-19 period. For each year we apply PCA and extract 30 principal components (PCs) as many as the social identity variables. Afterward, we run regression of the 30 PCs with dependent variable *compliance with the rules* regarding the agreement of the individuals to the following statement; one should always obey the rules regardless of their enforcement provisions. We then locate the statistically significant PCs with loadings |0.30| and re-run regression with dependent variable *compliance with the law* for each year to determine the factors shaping the obligation for lawful behavior.

*4.2 The Social Identity Variables*

For the analysis, we use an abundance of variables –each one corresponding to a question from the field research. The determining variables of social identity belong to three categories (a) degree of satisfaction and individual state, (b) identity traits, and (c) demographics. These three groups correspond to a general social identity profile that relates to both personal and social characteristics. Through the empirical analysis, for the determination of views toward lawful behavior, this generalized social identity profile becomes more specific because it is framed by only the statistically significant variables. This process allows for the emergence of the social categorical self (Turner *et al.*, 1994) toward the shaping of complying with the law perceptions.

Given that the social identity formation depends on the emotional state (Mercer, 2014), the first group of variables aims to evaluate an individual’s viewpoint on life satisfaction, happiness, and feeling of security. We consider an individual’s emotional state because emotional well-being is affected by a crisis (Stieger *et al.*, 2021). For example, the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown measures bequeathed high uncertainty, loneliness, and lower levels of satisfaction with life (Stieger *et al.*, 2021).

While individual views are fused with social views due to depersonalization (Turner *et al.*, 1994), social identity is affected by a group’s representative behavioral patterns and social emotions (Marcer, 2014). Hence, the second group of variables captures collective and personal views governing social relationships which eventually generate formal and informal institutions. The variables that reflect social emotions are trust, altruism, equitability preferences, views on family, tradition, environment, and cultural change, as well as adherence to rules, and acknowledgment of external values.

Consequently, as political and economic behavior are equally important, we use variables reflecting the political and economic aspects of social identity. Of purely political nature are the variables concerning the role of the state in governance and inequality, views on the role of migrants, political self-definition, and lending. On the other hand, the variables indirectly affecting political beliefs are motives for wealth accumulation and for being successful, megalothymia, creativity, decision-making, adventure-seeking, surprises, and having a good time.

Last but not least, the third group of variables concerns identity traits such as state of health, age, income status, and level of education. The importance of these variables lies in the fact that the individuals are more prompt to belong to groups with which they share a high level of demographic similarity (Riordan, 2000).

**5. Evidence on the Determinants of Compliant Behavior Under Crisis**

In this study, we assume that during the course of the Covid-19 pandemic the shaping of the generalized views on whether an individual must always maintain a lawful behavior has experienced change. Nevertheless, between the two years, we expect both similarities and differences in the shaping of such an attitude, with this intuitive hypothesis being confirmed. The shaping of attitudes toward whether one should always obey the law is presented in the following Table 1.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **R2** | **Degree of Life Satisfaction** | **Identity Traits** | **Demographics** |
| Non-Covid-19 (2019) | 19.29% | Happiness ()  Satisfaction () | Tradition ()  Motive for Wealth Accumulation ()  Adherence to Rules ()  Role of the State ()  Political Self-Definition ()  Equitability () | - |
| Covid-19 (2020) | 18.28% | - | Tradition ()  Motive for Wealth Accumulation ()  Trust ()  Security ()  Family () | Age () |

**Table 1. The Shaping of Compliance with the Law Perceptions Under Crisis**

Prior to discussing and interpreting the results concerning compliance with the law, we observe that both years display values of R2 close to 20%. Broadly, high values of R2 indicate better robustness of a model. However, this relatively low value of the R2 is acceptable due to the nature of our study. In social studies we aim to test a theory and, particularly, the relationships formed between the variables hence, R2 is irrelevant (Moksony, 1999).

For each year we observe different variables contributing in the shaping of beliefs regarding compliance but there are two variables that prevail in both years. These variables are tradition, and the motive for wealth accumulation.

Respect for tradition positively affects beliefs of compliance with laws perception, which is explained by the relationship between tradition and law in general. All legal systems depend on traditionality and past-maintenance regardless the state of institutionalization of a system (Kryeger, 1986). As in all institutions, legal systems stem from legal culture and tradition which in turn shapes cultural perceptions (Zartner, 2012). That said, regardless the contextual and social factors of a crisis, respect for tradition is important (Hayek, 1958) to maintain lawful behavior.

Wealth accumulation behavior positively relates to complying with the law. Efficient legal systems and institutions generate positive externalities for economic growth (Lorizio and Gurrieri, 2014; Berggren *et al.*, 2012) and hence, opportunities for wealth accumulation. As a result, better civil justice systems boost investment and innovation by protecting property and contract rights (Posner, 1998). The presence of such a variable in both years is in line with the fact that wealth and income are the main determinants of consumption and social status rendering them essential for quantity and quality of life (Becker *et al.*, 2005) regardless of the state of the economy. Thus, the aspiration of becoming wealthy significantly contributes to lawful behavior assuming that institutions promote economic growth.

Commenting on the quality of life, we found that two components of subjective well-being, namely happiness and life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; 2013) determine compliance with the law for the non-Covid-19 year of 2019. In particular, being happy positively affects compliance while reduced life satisfaction is negatively associated with compliance (Krekel *et al.*, 2022). These variables communicate the phycological state of an individual which is found to affect decision making, risk perception (Leith and Baumeister, 1996), and lawful behavior through risk and the possibility of punishment (Bliz and Nadler, 2014).

Delving deeper into the analysis for 2019, we find that favorable attitudes on teaching children discipline positively affect lawful behavior. As the educational system is one of the most salient formal institutions, this relationship is not surprising. Discipline codes define the school community (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002), and obedience to these codes determines whether one is a part of this community or an outsider (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Erikson, 1966).

For variables representing political views, we spot three significant relationships entering the 2019 analysis. State intervention neutrality negatively affects views on compliance with the law. A restricted role of the state is associated with the support of market liberty (Novkov, 2008) and therefore opposes strict regulation of society through legislation. Additionally, we find that association with left party beliefs is negatively related to obedience (Frimer *et al.*, 2014), whereas believing in equal rights is positively associated with lawful behavior. Besides, laws ensure the formal equality principle of Aristoteles and serve justice (Beever, 2004).

Thereupon, it is worth noting that obedience to law is not ideologically divisive, however, it depends on the contextual factors (Frimer *et al.*, 2014) as politics and institutional environments influence the prevalence of legal systems (Novkov, 2008). The above-mentioned relationships should be interpreted under their relative importance to lawful behavior and not as dogmatic attitudes against compliance. Besides, individuals obey rules that agree with their personal views on ethics, and right or wrong (Tyler and De Cremer, 2009).

For the year 2020, social emotions and informal institutions determine compliance. That said, low levels of societal trust negatively affect compliance. Social trust is a form of learned behavior which defines social relationships and transfuses cohesion and stability in a society (Newton, 2007). As a result, in times of crisis, a lack of social trust negatively affects the behavior of individuals in terms of compliance due to the regulatory nature of laws (Schmeisser *et al.*, 2021). Furthermore, low level of trust may be associated with greater resistance to new formal constraints (Bentkowska, 2021). On the other hand, feeling secure contributes to compliance through the need to maintain stability and reduce possible sources of uncertainty from unwanted behavioral patterns. Thus, legal systems should foster trust and bequeath security.

Another factor shaping beliefs regarding compliance concerns the role of the family. Our findings suggest that when family ties are highly valued so does the belief to maintain a lawful behavior. Individual social values affect the institutional environment either through social norms or through formal institutions (Gerxhani and van Breemen, 2019). These values are a product of social interactions, especially through family and friendship. Hence this positive relationship is not surprising. Principally, laws often go unforced because they conflict with the prevailing social norms (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017) and, probably, social identities. Thus, especially in times of crisis, the law-enforcement should always respect salient informal institutions and social norms. For example, formal restrictions are successful only if they are supported by strong informal institutions and provide a secure environment (Bentkowska, 2021).

Last but not least, for 2020 we find that the younger an individual is, the less they feel obligated to maintain lawful behavior when no one enforces it. In general, adolescents and young adults have low potential rates of compliance, a fact especially true for the Covid-19 pandemic measures (Jaureguizar *et al.*, 2021; Nivette *et al.*, 2021). That said, lawful behavior depends on the type of regulation, the age of an individual, and the type of enforcement.

**6. Conclusive Discussion; In Time of Crisis Informal Institutions Prevail**

As compliance with the law perceptions falls under institutional analysis, this study examines the shift in beliefs regarding compliance using the Covid-19 pandemic as a case study. To this end, we choose social identity as an analytical vehicle because its formation is highly associated with norms and social behavior (Sen, 1985).

First and foremost, we find that regardless of the year under examination, there are two common factors contributing to the shaping of beliefs regarding compliance: tradition and motive for wealth accumulation. The presence of these variables in both years confers significant importance in applying and generating institutional tools such as the law. Specifically, respect for tradition ensures cultural path dependence and social coherency via common customs and practices. Through tradition, cultural knowledge is perpetuated, activating the salient identity features (Halloran and Kashima, 2012). Tradition reinforces societal values and stability (Hofstede et al., 2010). Wealth grants significant access to consumption and investment and reduces high uncertainty because money is associated with all economic activity (Schumpeter, 1954). Both tradition and wealth consist of positive factors for social regulation using laws as they provide individuals and society stability to overcome the consequences of a crisis.

Broadly, we find that during 2019 the shaping of compliance depends on a range of variables associated with personal characteristics, social emotions, attitudes toward formal institutions, and political beliefs. Before the pandemic outbreak, individuals' perceptions on compliance depended on the quality of formal educational institutions than on state intervention to regulate the economy. Furthermore, we find that happier people are more compliant. In opposition, for 2020, we observe a strong presence of social emotions and informal institutions shaping compliance. This observation leads us to the conclusion that in times of crisis, individuals rely on informal institutions and social norms (Bentkowska, 2021), which eventually affect their attitudes toward compliance. This conclusion is in line with Acemoglu and Jackson (2017).

The fact that individuals’ beliefs for compliance for 2020 mainly depended on variables indicating the quality of social interactions is especially interesting in terms of social identity theory. The imposed uncertainty from the Covid-19 crisis destabilized certain identities (Abrams *et al.*, 2021) and generated distrust for the authorities (Acemoglu *et al.*, 2019). Consequently, individuals turned to their close social environment prioritizing their existential and economic security. Regarding policymaking and law enforcement in times of uncertainty and crisis, this finding indicates that individuals do not always turn to political institutions for guidance. Therefore, further research is guided toward examining the relationship among institutional quality, regulation, and social trust.

The Covid-19 pandemic is differentiated from past crises due to the posed threat to human life and the global economy. The mitigation of the crisis required the generation of new knowledge in the scientific (vaccines) and organizational (economic restoration) fields. These circumstances highlighted the importance of the human factor, which is subjected to greater depreciation in the case of the pandemic. In other words, given that the Covid-19 crisis mitigation depended on the knowledge economy’s growth rate, which was impacted by the disruptive power of the pandemic on human capital, relying on social interactions and emotions is not surprising. That said, the complex nature of the Covid-19 shock will eventually reshape social values, institutions, and behaviors due to its consequences’ novelty, rapidity, and severity.

The conclusions drawn from the present study provide interesting insights for the design of formal institutions, such as enforcing the law in times of crisis. Specifically, if policymakers want to attain higher levels of compliance, they should consider the various aspects of human nature that shape lawful behavior beyond posing sanctions. In this manner, the accumulated knowledge can be used to design flexible, efficient, and appropriate 'nudge' policies contributing to the efficiency and resilience of economies and legal systems (Hume *et al.*, 2021).

**Appendix**

1. The Social Identity variables

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name of Variable** | **Question** | **Scale of Answers and Quantification** | |
| Degree of Life Satisfaction and Individual State | | | |
| Happiness | How happy would you say you are? | Perfectly Unhappy to Exceptionally Happy | |
| Scale from 0 to 10 | |
| Satisfaction | Overall, how satisfied are you with your life today? | Perfectly Dissatisfied to Exceptionally Satisfied | |
| Scale from 0 to 10 | |
| Security | Is it important for you to live in a safe environment? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Identity Traits | | | |
| *Basic Traits* | | | |
| Creativity | Is it important for you to be creative and have new ideas? | | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| Equitability | Do you believe that all people in the world should be treated equally? | | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| Inequality and the State | Do you agree that government must take measures to reduce the income gap? | | Completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, completely disagree. |
| 1,2,3,4,5 (respectively) |
| Megalothymia | Is it important for you to show your abilities? | | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| Religiosity | Regardless of whether you belong to a specific religion, how religious would you say you are on a scale from 0 to 10? | | Not religious at all to Extremely religious |
| Scale from 0 to 10 |
| Tradition | Is tradition important for you? | | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| Adherence to rules | Do you believe that schools need to teach children to adhere to rules and to be disciplined? | | Completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, completely disagree. |
| 1,2,3,4,5 (respectively) |
| Acknowledgment of external values | Do you believe that people should do what they are told? | | Very much so, yes, somewhat, a little, not so, not at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| Having a good time | It is important for you to have a good time? | | Very much so, yes, somewhat, a little, not so, not at all |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) |
| *Life Attitudes* | | | |
| The role of migrants | Do you believe that our culture is enriched by the presence of migrants in our country? | Agree, probably agree, probably disagree, disagree | |
| 1,2,3,4 (respectively) | |
| Role of the state | Do you agree with the following sentence? The less the state intervenes in the economy, the better for the country | Completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, completely disagree. | |
| 1,2,3,4,5 (respectively) | |
| Cultural change | Overall, is the cultural life of Greece downgraded or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? | Cultural life is downgraded to Cultural life is enriched | |
| Scale from 0 to 10 | |
| Altruism | Is it important for you to help others? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Environment | Do you firmly believe that it is important for people to take care of nature? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Trust | Generally speaking, would you say that we can trust people or we should always be cautious? | We should always be cautious to We can trust most people | |
| Scale from 0 to 10 | |
| Motive for wealth accumulation | Is it important for you to be wealthy? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Surprises | Do you enjoy surprises and experiencing new things? | Extremely so, yes, moderately so, a little, not so, not at all. | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Making decisions | Is it important for you to make decisions about the things you do? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Successful | Is it important for you to be successful? | Extremely so, yes it’s important, it’s somewhat important, a little, not important, not important at all | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Seeking adventure | Do you seek adventure and do you enjoy taking risks? | Extremely so, yes, moderately so, a little, not so, not at all. | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Political self-definition | How would you position yourself in politics? | Left to Right | |
| Scale from 0 to 10 | |
| Demographics | | | |
| State of Health | How would you assess your current state of health? | Very good, good, average, poor, very poor | |
| 1,2,3,4,5 (respectively) | |
| Income status | In which of the following categories does the total monthly income after tax of your household belong? | <700 euro, 701-1000 euro, 1001-1250 euro,  1251-1500 euro, 1501-1750 euro, 1750 -2000 euro, 2001-2500 euro, 2501-3000 euro, 3001-4000 euro, 4001 euro and over | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 (respectively) | |
| Age | In what age category do you fall under? | 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+ years of age | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6 (respectively) | |
| Level of education | What is the highest level of education you have completed? | Attended some primary school, graduated from primary school, three years of high school, graduated from six years of high school/lyceum, graduated from technical school /vocational training Institute, graduated from technical college, graduated from tertiary education, completed postgraduate studies | |
| 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 (respectively) | |

1. **Compliance for 2019 (Non-Covid-19)**

Social Identity 2019

* 1. **Results of the Principal Components Analysis**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Importance of component** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **PC1** | **PC2** | **PC3** | **PC4** | **PC5** | **PC6** | **PC7** | **PC8** | **PC9** | **PC10** |
| **Standard deviation** | 2.1682 | 1.8445 | 1.47264 | 1.42066 | 1.15319 | 1.12865 | 1.07675 | 1.0247 | 1.008 | 0.9581 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.1567 | 0.1134 | 0.07229 | 0.06728 | 0.04433 | 0.04246 | 0.03865 | 0.035 | 0.03387 | 0.0306 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.1567 | 0.2701 | 0.34239 | 0.40967 | 0.454 | 0.49646 | 0.53511 | 0.5701 | 0.60398 | 0.6346 |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **PC11** | **PC12** | **PC13** | **PC14** | **PC15** | **PC16** | **PC17** | **PC18** | **PC19** | **PC20** |
| **Standard deviation** | 0.93141 | 0.89844 | 0.88467 | 0.86766 | 0.84646 | 0.82747 | 0.79422 | 0.77552 | 0.7545 | 0.73564 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.02892 | 0.02691 | 0.02609 | 0.02509 | 0.02388 | 0.02282 | 0.02103 | 0.02005 | 0.01898 | 0.01804 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.66349 | 0.6904 | 0.71649 | 0.74158 | 0.76546 | 0.78829 | 0.80931 | 0.82936 | 0.84834 | 0.86638 |
|  | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **PC21** | **PC22** | **PC23** | **PC24** | **PC25** | **PC26** | **PC27** | **PC28** | **PC29** | **PC30** |
| **Standard deviation** | 0.71845 | 0.71692 | 0.69445 | 0.6774 | 0.64526 | 0.6435 | 0.60957 | 0.56774 | 0.55991 | 0.44675 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.01721 | 0.01713 | 0.01608 | 0.0153 | 0.01388 | 0.0138 | 0.01239 | 0.01074 | 0.01045 | 0.00665 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.88358 | 0.90071 | 0.91679 | 0.9321 | 0.94596 | 0.9598 | 0.97215 | 0.9829 | 0.99335 | 1 |

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|  | **PC1** | **PC2** | **PC3** | **PC4** | **PC5** | **PC6** | **PC7** | **PC8** | **PC9** | **PC10** |
| **Happiness** | 0.166985 | -0.02877 | 0.501201 | -0.16943 | 0.105508 | -0.03335 | 0.038396 | -0.05168 | -0.18282 | 0.131351 |
| **Satisfaction** | 0.142073 | -0.01203 | 0.517825 | -0.15503 | 0.120375 | -0.07113 | 0.056098 | -0.0969 | -0.20597 | 0.142359 |
| **Security** | 0.001761 | 0.226542 | -0.04881 | 0.267035 | 0.190701 | -0.17264 | -0.132 | 0.156572 | -0.25504 | -0.10389 |
| **Creativity** | -0.30823 | 0.123596 | 0.026872 | 0.011695 | 0.016348 | -0.048 | 0.008917 | -0.06343 | -0.08647 | -0.05917 |
| **Equitability** | -0.14579 | 0.189304 | 0.172187 | 0.320251 | -0.15337 | -0.14422 | -0.02146 | 0.06634 | 0.066682 | -0.05368 |
| **Inequality and the State** | 0.016431 | 0.126284 | 0.26193 | 0.197993 | -0.20338 | 0.143393 | -0.01359 | -0.10921 | 0.445961 | 0.180354 |
| **Megalothymia** | -0.26214 | 0.13015 | 0.026878 | -0.18959 | 0.297118 | 0.145572 | -0.07273 | -0.0175 | -0.02676 | 0.189066 |
| **Religiosity** | -0.17829 | -0.2491 | 0.203927 | 0.130971 | -0.02598 | -0.16219 | -0.10857 | -0.06891 | 0.023611 | -0.19523 |
| **Tradition** | 0.071297 | 0.394998 | -0.07396 | 0.090603 | 0.126608 | -0.01323 | 0.00031 | -0.05182 | -0.12182 | 0.038568 |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.108162 | 0.327774 | -0.11788 | 0.033724 | 0.209687 | 0.126028 | 0.041788 | -0.20171 | 0.188546 | 0.084359 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | 0.092673 | 0.203709 | 0.045173 | -0.24281 | -0.09396 | 0.324391 | 0.162226 | -0.10417 | 0.045181 | -0.38312 |
| **Having a good time** | -0.26552 | 0.159558 | 0.102955 | -0.14173 | -0.05835 | -0.07656 | -0.06761 | 0.205471 | 0.096363 | -0.08354 |
| **The role of migrants** | -0.15101 | -0.15033 | 0.139966 | 0.276983 | 0.304349 | 0.430259 | -0.02611 | 0.045476 | -0.03886 | -0.22038 |
| **Role of state** | -0.02719 | 0.063596 | 0.125853 | -0.1006 | -0.24213 | 0.339707 | 0.488494 | 0.146419 | -0.27223 | -0.12822 |
| **Cultural change** | 0.131294 | 0.250838 | -0.00826 | -0.28047 | -0.2376 | -0.43595 | 0.065116 | -0.06905 | 0.056438 | 0.094577 |
| **Altruism** | -0.04106 | 0.200496 | 0.107959 | 0.226169 | -0.20356 | 0.212696 | 0.19055 | 0.063511 | -0.00084 | 0.235764 |
| **Environment** | -0.10049 | 0.269548 | 0.169244 | 0.308719 | 0.028907 | -0.13266 | 0.030508 | 0.013045 | -0.10651 | 0.047531 |
| **Trust** | 0.093356 | 0.039148 | 0.139286 | -0.05824 | 0.397855 | -0.24617 | 0.192511 | -0.10368 | 0.319198 | -0.48278 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | -0.22039 | 0.072499 | 0.046061 | -0.331 | -0.00555 | 0.138478 | -0.14437 | 0.011806 | 0.125759 | 0.037438 |
| **Surprises** | -0.30325 | 0.162131 | 0.060512 | -0.08959 | -0.11521 | -0.01556 | -0.00396 | -0.00985 | -0.07378 | -0.08813 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.2047 | 0.173914 | 0.207266 | 0.077744 | -0.06224 | -0.13745 | -0.07312 | 0.209098 | 0.012853 | -0.24979 |
| **Successful** | -0.25767 | 0.084163 | -0.03167 | -0.22183 | 0.381031 | 0.084471 | -0.15569 | 0.058157 | -0.01749 | 0.201321 |
| **Seeks adventure** | -0.29778 | 0.070356 | 0.059244 | -0.24938 | -0.15523 | -0.01282 | -0.07365 | -0.02403 | 0.10238 | 0.044297 |
| **Political self-definition** | -0.06358 | -0.20326 | 0.251715 | 0.137848 | 0.009952 | 0.061011 | -0.06194 | -0.12067 | 0.354823 | 0.265506 |
| **State of health** | -0.26197 | -0.03756 | -0.20288 | 0.070477 | -0.11456 | -0.03557 | 0.14306 | -0.44914 | -0.04574 | -0.07023 |
| **Income status** | 0.100159 | 0.096436 | -0.04759 | 0.018749 | -0.24122 | 0.220458 | -0.58906 | -0.00439 | -0.10095 | -0.10606 |
| **Age** | -0.29696 | -0.12062 | -0.0833 | 0.042757 | -0.05337 | -0.0585 | 0.204658 | -0.28981 | 0.112469 | -0.04696 |
| **Level of education** | 0.2233 | 0.130142 | 0.069597 | -0.0943 | -0.08427 | 0.132032 | -0.20498 | 0.123725 | 0.343336 | -0.26217 |
| **Lending** | 0.078139 | 0.073697 | 0.154386 | 0.009421 | -0.07224 | 0.055184 | -0.28645 | -0.64112 | -0.27636 | -0.14447 |
| **Family** | 0.115669 | 0.323307 | -0.11883 | 0.083967 | 0.174259 | 0.092735 | 0.128629 | -0.15427 | 0.126371 | 0.1383 |

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|  | **PC11** | **PC12** | **PC13** | **PC14** | **PC15** | **PC16** | **PC17** | **PC18** | **PC19** | **PC20** |
| **Happiness** | -0.16563 | -0.15424 | -0.15229 | 0.073084 | 0.091133 | 0.034875 | 0.066003 | -0.08036 | -0.05606 | -0.11534 |
| **Satisfaction** | -0.12487 | -0.09503 | -0.16384 | 0.033786 | 0.070752 | 0.0533 | 0.041966 | -0.13468 | 0.023126 | -0.10396 |
| **Security** | -0.09479 | 0.392472 | -0.35221 | -0.38555 | 0.025675 | 0.179745 | -0.00365 | -0.14146 | -0.21121 | 0.022413 |
| **Creativity** | 0.204094 | -0.21352 | 0.032951 | -0.05889 | 0.0373 | 0.133845 | 0.503729 | 0.012911 | -0.01592 | 0.050772 |
| **Equitability** | -0.05754 | 0.021072 | 0.296053 | -0.0206 | -0.17063 | -0.00973 | 0.380455 | -0.213 | 0.113766 | -0.46437 |
| **Inequality and the State** | -0.34504 | 0.119545 | 0.009184 | -0.40671 | 0.206639 | -0.26314 | -0.06005 | 0.120274 | 0.019342 | 0.13599 |
| **Megalothymia** | -0.04382 | 0.142665 | 0.254727 | -0.13255 | -0.13842 | -0.21463 | 0.172254 | 0.060724 | -0.24383 | 0.109523 |
| **Religiosity** | 0.037505 | -0.00464 | -0.04498 | -0.07397 | -0.29749 | 0.199642 | -0.3503 | 0.238449 | -0.20035 | -0.09214 |
| **Tradition** | 0.082292 | -0.14088 | -0.14185 | -0.04174 | 0.199994 | 0.095075 | 0.025831 | 0.070111 | -0.07269 | 0.034412 |
| **Adherence to rules** | -0.13681 | -0.1634 | 0.101598 | -0.0493 | -0.19717 | 8.61E-05 | -0.1742 | -0.07661 | 0.206926 | -0.29449 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | -0.2789 | -0.02687 | 0.124641 | -0.00825 | -0.27584 | 0.274976 | 0.041211 | 0.109353 | -0.47492 | -0.02368 |
| **Having a good time** | -0.0525 | 0.280365 | -0.10171 | 0.130758 | -0.11208 | 0.105322 | -0.30944 | -0.21682 | 0.218666 | -0.27578 |
| **The role of migrants** | -0.06912 | -0.05704 | -0.03396 | 0.104478 | 0.180332 | 0.039785 | 0.040966 | 0.068491 | 0.105126 | -0.0498 |
| **Role of state** | 0.341739 | 0.032456 | -0.04732 | -0.37312 | -0.11187 | -0.17625 | -0.14301 | -0.09993 | 0.213423 | -0.01748 |
| **Cultural change** | 0.072241 | 0.061429 | -0.01222 | -0.02891 | -0.10444 | -0.06102 | 0.051892 | 0.076286 | -0.10416 | 0.051573 |
| **Altruism** | 0.063318 | 0.374483 | -0.19186 | 0.622803 | -0.07586 | -0.10952 | 0.072972 | 0.122698 | -0.18415 | 0.051236 |
| **Environment** | 0.06162 | -0.16867 | 0.054946 | 0.002615 | -0.06133 | 0.164028 | -0.15463 | 0.537208 | 0.179811 | 0.138763 |
| **Trust** | 0.180034 | 0.097548 | -0.20796 | 0.095065 | -0.07543 | -0.41776 | 0.111395 | 0.172088 | 0.084738 | -0.02356 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | -0.10434 | 0.130928 | -0.30267 | -0.05796 | -0.21754 | 0.255669 | 0.254176 | 0.118803 | 0.45276 | 0.307255 |
| **Surprises** | 0.22202 | -0.05649 | -0.02269 | -0.08119 | 0.320646 | -0.18484 | -0.05479 | 0.079894 | -0.23663 | -0.12084 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.13589 | -0.2814 | 0.186102 | 0.182012 | -0.05695 | -0.1341 | -0.17823 | -0.40624 | -0.0165 | 0.545189 |
| **Successful** | 0.093953 | 0.103781 | 0.091761 | 0.035505 | -0.00695 | -0.13105 | -0.18542 | -0.06789 | -0.10706 | -0.10406 |
| **Seeks adventure** | 0.023343 | -0.17098 | -0.01842 | 0.059427 | 0.294412 | 0.081543 | -0.19604 | 0.21807 | 0.009873 | -0.21892 |
| **Political self-definition** | 0.487972 | -0.06129 | -0.0948 | -0.141 | -0.26501 | 0.166565 | 0.027854 | -0.18655 | -0.2207 | 0.065566 |
| **State of health** | -0.11612 | -0.10498 | -0.23787 | 0.073193 | -0.04105 | 0.044988 | 0.058414 | -0.11669 | 0.05232 | -0.08579 |
| **Income status** | 0.035488 | -0.26943 | -0.38944 | 0.003237 | -0.21858 | -0.39422 | 0.034932 | 0.006315 | -0.0665 | -0.12142 |
| **Age** | -0.18779 | 0.048227 | -0.241 | -0.01469 | 0.212962 | -0.0204 | -0.02379 | -0.22676 | -0.12883 | 0.058668 |
| **Level of education** | 0.254563 | 0.114344 | 0.03746 | 0.053468 | 0.396 | 0.313858 | 0.081264 | -0.10907 | -0.01461 | -0.03068 |
| **Lending** | 0.185627 | 0.360924 | 0.307447 | 0.049565 | 0.054666 | -0.01631 | -0.11207 | -0.06863 | 0.174871 | 0.141218 |
| **Family** | 0.179458 | -0.21846 | -0.14314 | 0.068066 | -0.03917 | 0.138629 | -0.2171 | -0.23907 | -0.01149 | 0.100341 |

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|  | **PC21** | **PC22** | **PC23** | **PC24** | **PC25** | **PC26** | **PC27** | **PC28** | **PC29** | **PC30** |
| **Happiness** | -0.03263 | 0.022606 | 0.052292 | 0.047282 | 0.003519 | 0.052446 | -0.09134 | 0.014531 | 0.015485 | -0.69976 |
| **Satisfaction** | -0.03393 | -0.08102 | 0.012773 | 0.029686 | 0.006486 | 0.081276 | 0.120785 | -0.07151 | 0.012222 | 0.682468 |
| **Security** | -0.08586 | 0.132267 | 0.052513 | -0.11863 | 0.274874 | 0.093864 | -0.13751 | 0.072619 | -0.0835 | 0.000751 |
| **Creativity** | -0.00084 | 0.345696 | 0.09208 | 0.496134 | 0.212419 | -0.2266 | 0.124822 | -0.11556 | -0.06092 | 0.010747 |
| **Equitability** | -0.11538 | -0.30239 | -0.13012 | -0.22592 | -0.02588 | -0.13307 | -0.11093 | 0.004386 | 0.10276 | -0.02179 |
| **Inequality and the State** | 0.074859 | 0.046285 | 0.036862 | 0.24136 | -0.02134 | -0.13162 | -0.16512 | -0.09471 | 0.01685 | 0.03381 |
| **Megalothymia** | -0.18017 | -0.23407 | 0.008524 | 0.014859 | -0.18432 | 0.282593 | 0.173757 | -0.01212 | -0.46663 | -0.04396 |
| **Religiosity** | -0.4198 | -0.07701 | 0.228872 | 0.188684 | -0.25523 | -0.25139 | 0.033304 | -0.01129 | 0.005949 | 0.000769 |
| **Tradition** | 0.289842 | -0.07732 | 0.220075 | -0.24627 | -0.53829 | -0.40181 | 0.100104 | -0.10799 | -0.09089 | -0.01445 |
| **Adherence to rules** | -0.20802 | 0.401538 | 0.329099 | -0.09546 | 0.05963 | 0.153978 | 0.266424 | 0.170464 | 0.093765 | -0.0076 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | 0.21717 | 0.017581 | -0.14033 | -0.06044 | 0.104127 | -0.02717 | -0.04978 | -0.06841 | 0.10819 | 0.044975 |
| **Having a good time** | 0.358506 | 0.14806 | -0.20846 | 0.278076 | -0.19435 | 0.07087 | 0.147648 | -0.14733 | -0.20281 | -0.05724 |
| **The role of migrants** | 0.057656 | 0.092375 | -0.21164 | 0.060798 | -0.15823 | -0.05587 | -0.10927 | 0.582395 | -0.09597 | 0.069034 |
| **Role of state** | -0.03896 | -0.13825 | 0.153886 | 0.006434 | 0.059881 | -0.0714 | 0.040812 | 0.076374 | -0.0566 | -0.04131 |
| **Cultural change** | 0.0279 | -0.00093 | -0.1 | 0.15389 | -0.09592 | -0.06821 | -0.04414 | 0.688286 | -0.03093 | 0.043348 |
| **Altruism** | -0.14751 | 0.094087 | 0.177537 | -0.00892 | 0.05977 | -0.05084 | 0.008692 | -0.00431 | 0.00381 | 0.024895 |
| **Environment** | 0.217348 | -0.25865 | -0.1014 | 0.039126 | 0.21892 | 0.31614 | 0.199875 | 0.010226 | 0.109661 | -0.06499 |
| **Trust** | 0.036696 | -0.00236 | -0.00554 | -0.08587 | 0.084684 | -0.03296 | -0.05889 | -0.13037 | -0.05977 | -0.00767 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | -0.19873 | -0.02335 | -0.04527 | -0.21905 | -0.12591 | -0.04213 | -0.0754 | -0.00414 | 0.222435 | -0.01981 |
| **Surprises** | -0.19598 | 0.267845 | -0.20596 | -0.10095 | -0.29481 | 0.349066 | -0.08804 | -0.08413 | 0.423879 | 0.02544 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.01525 | 0.058956 | 0.185275 | -0.12428 | 0.030061 | 0.022147 | -0.06355 | 0.063188 | -0.01385 | 0.020173 |
| **Successful** | 0.199559 | -0.26956 | 0.204058 | 0.145728 | 0.239227 | -0.25027 | -0.17245 | 0.097032 | 0.461461 | 0.020512 |
| **Seeks adventure** | -0.08626 | 0.052189 | 0.01978 | -0.36341 | 0.373531 | -0.18269 | -0.18475 | 0.021492 | -0.42964 | 0.047784 |
| **Political self-definition** | 0.302086 | 0.14124 | -0.01657 | -0.25803 | 0.013476 | 0.109336 | 0.000208 | 0.072339 | -0.0293 | -0.00914 |
| **State of health** | 0.174765 | -0.21182 | 0.339034 | 0.138201 | -0.09798 | 0.356846 | -0.40786 | 0.023969 | -0.09195 | 0.034291 |
| **Income status** | 0.030701 | -0.1165 | -0.05845 | 0.060663 | 0.088449 | -7.1E-05 | 0.149468 | 0.025309 | -0.03536 | -1.8E-05 |
| **Age** | -0.03718 | -0.21674 | -0.14676 | -0.10613 | 0.135391 | -0.12867 | 0.607173 | 0.11612 | 0.126003 | -0.11727 |
| **Level of education** | -0.12728 | -0.30562 | 0.292883 | 0.162467 | 0.019315 | 0.223068 | 0.127772 | 0.071911 | 0.00099 | -0.02149 |
| **Lending** | 0.020927 | 0.081148 | -0.08242 | -0.05742 | 0.053281 | -0.09896 | -0.00379 | -0.02655 | -0.02094 | -0.04785 |
| **Family** | -0.34308 | -0.17966 | -0.47049 | 0.217166 | 0.03216 | -0.09733 | -0.22878 | -0.13049 | -0.08763 | -0.01299 |

* 1. **PC Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (631x30)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -24.211 | -0.6549 | -0.1237 | 0.4858 | 25.242 |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| **(Intercept)** | -2.33E-16 | 3.56E-02 | 0 | 1 |  |
| **PC1** | -7.15E-03 | 1.64E-02 | -0.435 | 0.66354 |  |
| **PC2** | 1.73E-01 | 1.93E-02 | 8.977 | < 2e-16 | \*\*\* |
| **PC3** | -4.16E-02 | 2.42E-02 | -1.719 | 0.08619 | . |
| **PC4** | 5.60E-02 | 2.51E-02 | 2.234 | 0.02583 | \* |
| **PC5** | 2.16E-03 | 3.09E-02 | 0.07 | 0.94417 |  |
| **PC6** | -6.41E-02 | 3.16E-02 | -2.032 | 0.04257 | \* |
| **PC7** | -1.53E-01 | 3.31E-02 | -4.612 | 4.88E-06 | \*\*\* |
| **PC8** | -1.61E-02 | 3.48E-02 | -0.462 | 0.6441 |  |
| **PC9** | 5.32E-02 | 3.53E-02 | 1.506 | 0.13247 |  |
| **PC10** | -7.97E-02 | 3.72E-02 | -2.144 | 0.03245 | \* |
| **PC11** | -1.16E-01 | 3.83E-02 | -3.022 | 0.00262 | \*\* |
| **PC12** | -5.43E-02 | 3.97E-02 | -1.37 | 0.1712 |  |
| **PC13** | 2.32E-02 | 4.03E-02 | 0.576 | 0.5648 |  |
| **PC14** | -9.91E-03 | 4.11E-02 | -0.241 | 0.80928 |  |
| **PC15** | -1.17E-02 | 4.21E-02 | -0.278 | 0.78075 |  |
| **PC16** | 6.56E-02 | 4.31E-02 | 1.524 | 0.12816 |  |
| **PC17** | 2.76E-02 | 4.49E-02 | 0.615 | 0.53902 |  |
| **PC18** | 3.44E-02 | 4.59E-02 | 0.749 | 0.45422 |  |
| **PC19** | 2.25E-01 | 4.72E-02 | 4.767 | 2.35E-06 | \*\*\* |
| **PC20** | -4.87E-02 | 4.84E-02 | -1.006 | 0.3146 |  |
| **PC21** | -9.58E-02 | 4.96E-02 | -1.932 | 0.05381 | . |
| **PC22** | 1.31E-01 | 4.97E-02 | 2.63 | 0.00875 | \*\* |
| **PC23** | 2.72E-02 | 5.13E-02 | 0.53 | 0.59602 |  |
| **PC24** | -1.09E-01 | 5.26E-02 | -2.064 | 0.03943 | \* |
| **PC25** | -5.71E-02 | 5.52E-02 | -1.034 | 0.30163 |  |
| **PC26** | -9.01E-02 | 5.54E-02 | -1.628 | 0.10407 |  |
| **PC27** | 5.41E-02 | 5.84E-02 | 0.925 | 0.35532 |  |
| **PC28** | 6.19E-02 | 6.28E-02 | 0.986 | 0.32432 |  |
| **PC29** | 1.14E-02 | 6.36E-02 | 0.179 | 0.85791 |  |
| **PC30** | -2.19E-01 | 7.97E-02 | -2.743 | 0.00628 | \*\* |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.8942 on 600 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.2386, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2005

F-statistic: 6.266 on 30 and 600 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

* 1. **Regression of variables with loadings (≥ 0,30) which belong to statistically significant PC**
     1. Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (631x19)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -2.4672 | -0.6721 | -0.1321 | 0.5029 | 2.5714 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| **(Intercept)** | -0.85883 | 0.331363 | -2.592 | 0.009776 | \*\* |
| **Happiness** | 0.058188 | 0.028914 | 2.012 | 0.044613 | \* |
| **Satisfaction** | -0.07992 | 0.02716 | -2.943 | 0.003379 | \*\* |
| **Creativity** | 0.001411 | 0.039041 | 0.036 | 0.971188 |  |
| **Equitability** | 0.154161 | 0.042195 | 3.654 | 0.000281 | \*\*\* |
| **Inequality and the State** | 0.016829 | 0.045031 | 0.374 | 0.708749 |  |
| **Tradition** | 0.087108 | 0.039685 | 2.195 | 0.028541 | \* |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.279063 | 0.054776 | 5.095 | 4.66E-07 | \*\*\* |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | -0.05642 | 0.034088 | -1.655 | 0.098406 | . |
| **The role of migrants** | 0.031381 | 0.054248 | 0.578 | 0.563158 |  |
| **Role of state** | -0.09908 | 0.033179 | -2.986 | 0.002938 | \*\* |
| **Cultural change** | 0.018371 | 0.021191 | 0.867 | 0.38631 |  |
| **Environment** | 0.060792 | 0.046861 | 1.297 | 0.195023 |  |
| **Trust** | 0.005049 | 0.018513 | 0.273 | 0.785163 |  |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.098464 | 0.028557 | 3.448 | 0.000604 | \*\*\* |
| **Seeks adventure** | 0.011663 | 0.02832 | 0.412 | 0.68062 |  |
| **Political self-definition** | -0.05297 | 0.017699 | -2.993 | 0.002875 | \*\* |
| **Income status** | 0.019552 | 0.010959 | 1.784 | 0.074912 | . |
| **Level of education** | 0.06554 | 0.057094 | 1.148 | 0.25145 |  |
| **Family** | -0.05874 | 0.055878 | -1.051 | 0.293589 |  |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.9043 on 611 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.2068, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1822

F-statistic: 8.385 on 19 and 611 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

* + 1. Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (631x8)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -2.3461 | -0.6839 | -0.1353 | 0.5193 | 2.5939 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| **(Intercept)** | -0.6144 | 0.23093 | -2.661 | 0.008002 | \*\* |
| **Happiness** | 0.05973 | 0.02842 | 2.102 | 0.035957 | \* |
| **Satisfaction** | -0.07736 | 0.02685 | -2.881 | 0.004102 | \*\* |
| **Equitability** | 0.18078 | 0.03742 | 4.831 | 1.71E-06 | \*\*\* |
| **Tradition** | 0.10335 | 0.03555 | 2.907 | 0.003778 | \*\* |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.25558 | 0.04969 | 5.144 | 3.61E-07 | \*\*\* |
| **Role of state** | -0.11299 | 0.0323 | -3.498 | 0.000502 | \*\*\* |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.10058 | 0.02508 | 4.01 | 6.81E-05 | \*\*\* |
| **Political self-definition** | -0.04873 | 0.01695 | -2.875 | 0.004175 | \*\* |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.9041 on 622 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.1929, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1826

F-statistic: 18.59 on 8 and 622 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

1. **Compliance for 2020 (Covid-19)**

Social Identity 2020

* 1. **Results of the Principal Components Analysis**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Importance of component** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **PC1** | **PC2** | **PC3** | **PC4** | **PC5** | **PC6** | **PC7** | **PC8** | **PC9** | **PC10** |
| **Standard deviation** | 2.1639 | 1.8207 | 1.50927 | 1.31902 | 1.13652 | 1.1014 | 1.05329 | 1.02087 | 0.9891 | 0.97246 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.1561 | 0.1105 | 0.07593 | 0.05799 | 0.04306 | 0.04044 | 0.03698 | 0.03474 | 0.03261 | 0.03152 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.1561 | 0.2666 | 0.34251 | 0.40051 | 0.44356 | 0.484 | 0.52098 | 0.55572 | 0.58833 | 0.61985 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **PC11** | **PC12** | **PC13** | **PC14** | **PC15** | **PC16** | **PC17** | **PC18** | **PC19** | **PC20** |
| **Standard deviation** | 0.93695 | 0.91918 | 0.8677 | 0.86012 | 0.83872 | 0.82786 | 0.82354 | 0.80045 | 0.78819 | 0.77755 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.02926 | 0.02816 | 0.0251 | 0.02466 | 0.02345 | 0.02284 | 0.02261 | 0.02136 | 0.02071 | 0.02015 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.64911 | 0.67728 | 0.7024 | 0.72703 | 0.75048 | 0.77333 | 0.79593 | 0.81729 | 0.838 | 0.85815 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **PC21** | **PC22** | **PC23** | **PC24** | **PC25** | **PC26** | **PC27** | **PC28** | **PC29** | **PC30** |
| **Standard deviation** | 0.76851 | 0.747 | 0.71741 | 0.70536 | 0.66611 | 0.64979 | 0.62003 | 0.5902 | 0.57639 | 0.40455 |
| **Proportion of Variance** | 0.01969 | 0.0186 | 0.01716 | 0.01658 | 0.01479 | 0.01407 | 0.01281 | 0.01161 | 0.01107 | 0.00546 |
| **Cumulative Proportion** | 0.87784 | 0.8964 | 0.9136 | 0.93018 | 0.94497 | 0.95904 | 0.97186 | 0.98347 | 0.99454 | 1 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **PC1** | **PC2** | **PC3** | **PC4** | **PC5** | **PC6** | **PC7** | **PC8** | **PC9** | **PC10** |
| **Happiness** | 0.153629 | -0.03002 | 0.454668 | -0.33607 | 0.040695 | -0.16206 | 0.000263 | 0.000645 | 0.057676 | -0.13975 |
| **Satisfaction** | 0.144704 | -0.02232 | 0.460233 | -0.33548 | 0.079499 | -0.15493 | 0.006972 | 0.005558 | 0.049314 | -0.2126 |
| **Security** | 0.041481 | 0.299926 | 0.090991 | 0.132326 | 0.05074 | -0.12281 | 0.110129 | 0.01504 | -0.12671 | 0.428213 |
| **Creativity** | -0.28959 | 0.126524 | -0.00954 | 0.028376 | 0.006662 | 0.090419 | 0.152315 | 0.059202 | 0.025117 | -0.2916 |
| **Equitability** | -0.04675 | 0.171574 | 0.238736 | 0.255446 | 0.288024 | 0.048324 | -0.08098 | 0.14915 | -0.09454 | 0.125962 |
| **Inequality and the State** | -0.0102 | 0.101668 | 0.307029 | 0.248639 | 0.017385 | 0.124652 | -0.0434 | -0.3536 | 0.256288 | -0.05138 |
| **Megalothymia** | -0.23604 | 0.212421 | -0.024 | -0.09204 | -0.26569 | -0.01817 | 0.171917 | 0.009474 | 0.189174 | 0.099313 |
| **Religiosity** | -0.2236 | -0.18726 | 0.23493 | -0.02971 | -0.04811 | -0.22633 | -0.02303 | 0.008802 | -0.17 | 0.105474 |
| **Tradition** | 0.197394 | 0.354192 | -0.01531 | 0.094747 | -0.01442 | -0.04509 | 0.103707 | 0.090612 | -0.10036 | -0.06219 |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.143015 | 0.268613 | -0.13448 | 0.131097 | -0.20901 | -0.11495 | 0.059487 | -0.02036 | 0.186961 | -0.18309 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | 0.103008 | 0.131015 | -0.06965 | -0.17655 | -0.37631 | -0.074 | -0.37977 | -0.09043 | -0.20026 | -0.22108 |
| **Having a good time** | -0.226 | 0.209244 | -0.00905 | -0.25507 | -0.07699 | -0.01703 | -0.03753 | 0.156489 | 0.070678 | 0.228234 |
| **The role of migrants** | -0.14581 | -0.21496 | 0.159661 | 0.257029 | -0.3101 | -0.02264 | -0.10379 | 0.344095 | 0.235216 | -0.06301 |
| **Role of state** | -0.03872 | 0.065008 | 0.05051 | -0.07365 | -0.45495 | 0.19764 | -0.12571 | -0.54244 | -0.16603 | 0.169836 |
| **Cultural change** | 0.134725 | 0.235403 | -0.0387 | -0.32542 | 0.352007 | 0.073211 | 0.151844 | -0.253 | -0.00355 | 0.059261 |
| **Altruism** | 0.010808 | 0.166192 | 0.211373 | 0.285694 | 0.023277 | -0.13568 | 0.025675 | -0.33061 | 0.381028 | -0.0784 |
| **Environment** | -0.04139 | 0.206847 | 0.239569 | 0.259129 | 0.022495 | -0.03986 | -0.15596 | 0.093454 | -0.42701 | -0.01402 |
| **Trust** | 0.068694 | -0.10902 | 0.094873 | 0.017194 | -0.17867 | -0.02738 | 0.70545 | -0.00748 | -0.21654 | -0.07325 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | -0.22169 | 0.185361 | -0.01126 | -0.3018 | -0.03461 | -0.13376 | -0.05935 | 0.119673 | 0.144016 | 0.26471 |
| **Surprises** | -0.26123 | 0.134146 | 0.009458 | 0.044896 | 0.026295 | 0.262444 | 0.080609 | -0.01778 | -0.01311 | -0.32507 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.17212 | 0.231108 | 0.194958 | 0.032844 | 0.013209 | 0.067989 | -0.20718 | 0.065027 | -0.30127 | -0.03698 |
| **Successful** | -0.23996 | 0.235694 | 0.045629 | -0.11207 | -0.16344 | -0.06871 | 0.195042 | 0.118058 | 0.128139 | 0.045789 |
| **Seeks adventure** | -0.30404 | 0.099692 | 0.038369 | -0.17099 | 0.089299 | 0.137926 | -0.08339 | 0.053082 | 0.060914 | -0.30075 |
| **Political self-definition** | -0.11453 | -0.21769 | 0.303246 | 0.075314 | -0.14648 | -0.0465 | 0.089314 | 0.015522 | 0.039984 | 0.214874 |
| **State of health** | -0.27305 | -0.02869 | -0.13331 | 0.061793 | 0.189877 | 0.034117 | 0.070003 | -0.12921 | -0.08274 | 0.049508 |
| **Income status** | 0.12133 | 0.003063 | 0.152239 | -0.04567 | 0.050763 | 0.584563 | -0.0968 | 0.110585 | 0.283651 | 0.281339 |
| **Age** | -0.3117 | -0.07662 | 0.009547 | 0.012456 | 0.214327 | 0.047785 | 0.018579 | -0.14656 | -0.06092 | -0.14715 |
| **Level of education** | 0.246968 | 0.101787 | 0.012017 | -0.04743 | -0.04127 | 0.214628 | -0.0869 | 0.314455 | 0.081663 | -0.11942 |
| **Lending** | 0.090832 | -0.0069 | 0.164776 | -0.06666 | -0.18578 | 0.495086 | 0.237255 | 0.084674 | -0.23892 | -0.01274 |
| **Family** | 0.165774 | 0.300379 | -0.01107 | 0.128548 | -0.05295 | -0.12929 | 0.097585 | 0.142947 | 0.051327 | -0.0865 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **PC11** | **PC12** | **PC13** | **PC14** | **PC15** | **PC16** | **PC17** | **PC18** | **PC19** | **PC20** |
| **Happiness** | 0.018649 | 0.188371 | -0.08539 | -0.03971 | -0.00841 | -0.01813 | 0.109267 | 0.058113 | 0.006327 | 0.141704 |
| **Satisfaction** | 0.021233 | 0.181219 | -0.10628 | -0.04347 | 0.032628 | 0.022908 | 0.097827 | 0.053827 | 0.017548 | 0.097641 |
| **Security** | 0.202066 | -0.17868 | -0.19101 | 0.058828 | 0.070721 | -0.06118 | 0.376312 | 0.253002 | -0.28695 | 0.384661 |
| **Creativity** | -0.13713 | 0.055796 | -0.20945 | 0.138764 | 0.104818 | -0.04916 | -0.11117 | 0.268822 | -0.26844 | -0.26183 |
| **Equitability** | 0.060731 | 0.205201 | -0.14294 | 0.55918 | -0.18961 | 0.14161 | 0.096563 | -0.33577 | 0.239833 | -0.11366 |
| **Inequality and the State** | 0.227643 | -0.32421 | -0.02637 | -0.04238 | 0.312606 | -0.2928 | 0.01708 | 0.095002 | 0.433872 | -0.13312 |
| **Megalothymia** | -0.05665 | -0.01792 | -0.27998 | -0.10251 | 0.097852 | 0.228182 | 0.214543 | -0.15378 | 0.165705 | -0.26353 |
| **Religiosity** | -0.02869 | -0.19655 | -0.18015 | 0.169904 | 0.214901 | 0.047382 | -0.17801 | 0.206867 | -0.16222 | -0.24824 |
| **Tradition** | -0.08874 | 0.106757 | 0.089802 | -0.17309 | 0.081454 | -0.02426 | -0.13906 | -0.07542 | 0.04841 | 0.143382 |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.172751 | 0.256014 | 0.141709 | 0.11798 | 0.099961 | -0.31211 | -0.0156 | 0.058519 | -0.15703 | 0.060029 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | 0.294687 | -0.26188 | -0.01933 | 0.217988 | 0.019066 | 0.367942 | -0.22876 | 0.043766 | 0.142167 | 0.169413 |
| **Having a good time** | 0.183063 | -0.13265 | 0.239949 | 0.051223 | -0.16417 | -0.26031 | -0.15051 | -0.03538 | 0.099554 | 0.083716 |
| **The role of migrants** | 0.050649 | 0.144309 | -0.0399 | -0.0533 | -0.08548 | -0.01914 | 0.022387 | 0.232166 | -0.06453 | 0.077898 |
| **Role of state** | -0.24324 | 0.355927 | 0.066281 | 0.133935 | 0.009335 | -0.01591 | 0.257635 | -0.01612 | -0.08967 | -0.05517 |
| **Cultural change** | -0.06195 | -0.10488 | 0.053825 | 0.009267 | 0.098313 | -0.0014 | -0.18131 | 0.0164 | -0.19316 | -0.20449 |
| **Altruism** | 0.059766 | -0.10833 | 0.125325 | -0.08923 | -0.50462 | 0.315392 | -0.14146 | 0.005873 | -0.3036 | -0.07562 |
| **Environment** | -0.14069 | -0.0801 | 0.146161 | -0.41268 | 0.167878 | 0.255037 | -0.01872 | -0.06064 | -0.09799 | -0.05698 |
| **Trust** | -0.07583 | -0.14943 | 0.325863 | 0.234954 | -0.15181 | 0.162216 | 0.033361 | 0.231601 | 0.260715 | 0.0478 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.148101 | 0.084292 | 0.153087 | 0.126755 | -0.02418 | 0.118525 | -0.12171 | 0.093364 | -0.09635 | -0.13968 |
| **Surprises** | -0.1093 | -0.18884 | -0.12157 | 0.260401 | 0.114756 | 0.00088 | -0.00324 | -0.11412 | -0.23615 | 0.406672 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.18721 | 0.046772 | 0.170071 | -0.0237 | -0.32777 | -0.36345 | -0.08705 | 0.29644 | 0.135244 | -0.13474 |
| **Successful** | -0.14768 | -0.04349 | -0.09321 | -0.30338 | -0.05976 | 0.070977 | 0.031136 | -0.19797 | 0.192173 | 0.111722 |
| **Seeks adventure** | -0.06616 | -0.1023 | 0.20244 | -0.02066 | 0.038731 | -0.01224 | 0.213236 | -0.10166 | 0.03074 | 0.106166 |
| **Political self-definition** | 0.021023 | -0.0005 | 0.394476 | 0.07748 | 0.336459 | -0.087 | -0.20004 | -0.39418 | -0.23088 | 0.043241 |
| **State of health** | 0.36679 | 0.337787 | 0.072281 | -0.16711 | 0.172758 | 0.244737 | 0.013364 | 0.328938 | 0.160423 | 0.042489 |
| **Income status** | -0.24546 | 0.052716 | 0.055267 | 0.018106 | 0.092738 | 0.259671 | -0.23004 | 0.280777 | 0.077017 | 0.226515 |
| **Age** | 0.272307 | 0.239792 | 0.243072 | -0.04339 | 0.026179 | 0.115858 | 0.077471 | -0.07587 | -0.02014 | 0.11529 |
| **Level of education** | 0.145103 | -0.14848 | 0.345098 | 0.064417 | 0.125381 | 0.144921 | 0.483853 | 0.069541 | -0.15959 | -0.3872 |
| **Lending** | 0.490127 | 0.068886 | -0.26727 | -0.19193 | -0.18662 | -0.11042 | -0.19107 | -0.18127 | -0.16618 | -0.14511 |
| **Family** | -0.03867 | 0.299798 | -0.02328 | 0.132571 | 0.31214 | 0.086306 | -0.28779 | 0.012974 | 0.098247 | -0.06366 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **PC21** | **PC22** | **PC23** | **PC24** | **PC25** | **PC26** | **PC27** | **PC28** | **PC29** | **PC30** |
| **Happiness** | 0.100988 | -0.06616 | -0.08326 | -0.07451 | 0.118148 | -0.10516 | -0.03215 | -0.02803 | 0.047639 | -0.68436 |
| **Satisfaction** | 0.019747 | -0.01158 | -0.0173 | -0.01284 | 0.014026 | 0.018518 | 0.110485 | -0.01623 | -0.00105 | 0.701279 |
| **Security** | -0.13406 | 0.086605 | -0.06124 | 0.050423 | -0.17365 | 0.031052 | 0.098464 | 0.110937 | 0.1041 | -0.00115 |
| **Creativity** | 0.031791 | 0.197864 | -0.33694 | -0.40461 | -0.1443 | -0.00358 | 0.325473 | 0.056772 | -0.07233 | -0.04838 |
| **Equitability** | 0.039025 | 0.177784 | -0.00685 | -0.12913 | 0.019514 | 0.052906 | -0.11372 | -0.10921 | -0.0438 | 0.000412 |
| **Inequality and the State** | 0.080968 | -0.08592 | 0.031207 | -0.03971 | -0.12766 | 0.061371 | 0.047218 | -0.0341 | -0.15295 | -0.0299 |
| **Megalothymia** | 0.261239 | -0.0216 | -0.22017 | 0.28183 | 0.22116 | 0.054303 | -0.06337 | 0.231609 | 0.340872 | 0.030304 |
| **Religiosity** | -0.22953 | 0.075975 | 0.313623 | 0.050445 | 0.336541 | -0.04582 | -0.2995 | 0.224531 | -0.19546 | 0.005191 |
| **Tradition** | -0.00797 | -0.13036 | -0.34213 | -0.14261 | 0.040195 | 0.152423 | -0.43654 | 0.378019 | -0.40527 | 0.042147 |
| **Adherence to rules** | 0.293319 | 0.455915 | 0.278234 | 0.068618 | 0.243842 | -0.14948 | -0.10812 | -0.04032 | 0.038512 | 0.038049 |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | -0.05112 | 0.221348 | -0.20289 | 0.041512 | -0.07522 | 0.035982 | 0.034765 | -0.03517 | 0.031645 | -0.02498 |
| **Having a good time** | -0.07779 | -0.18808 | 0.015017 | -0.4147 | 0.4348 | 0.209486 | 0.169225 | -0.0087 | 0.161632 | 0.050528 |
| **The role of migrants** | -0.02546 | -0.02424 | -0.04456 | 0.074031 | -0.11693 | 0.560995 | -0.23034 | -0.25297 | 0.033527 | -0.02093 |
| **Role of state** | -0.12511 | -0.11264 | 0.082153 | -0.16023 | -0.01411 | 0.116053 | -0.02241 | -0.05866 | -0.09476 | 0.014678 |
| **Cultural change** | -0.05668 | 0.180807 | -0.0531 | 0.173657 | -0.02146 | 0.451733 | -0.21766 | -0.34669 | 0.128617 | -0.04367 |
| **Altruism** | -0.12585 | -0.09352 | 0.005335 | -0.04363 | 0.052566 | -0.11947 | -0.03153 | 0.071058 | 0.068358 | 0.020584 |
| **Environment** | 0.353143 | 0.022951 | 0.242754 | -0.17031 | 0.064414 | 0.101089 | 0.148853 | -0.15585 | 0.104895 | -0.01742 |
| **Trust** | 0.115521 | 0.02017 | 0.079523 | -0.01904 | -0.04971 | 0.06189 | 0.008888 | -0.0065 | 0.027237 | -0.00385 |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.404009 | -0.23661 | 0.177315 | 0.09255 | -0.43329 | -0.0996 | -0.0258 | -0.01328 | -0.32299 | -0.00214 |
| **Surprises** | 0.130844 | -0.39999 | 0.022876 | 0.19782 | 0.205147 | -0.10009 | -0.08156 | -0.25824 | -0.09294 | 0.032287 |
| **Makes decisions** | -0.07274 | 0.0075 | -0.20515 | 0.441952 | -0.01844 | -0.19895 | -0.01546 | 0.000138 | 0.111206 | 0.018885 |
| **Successful** | -0.3705 | 0.319511 | 0.102965 | 0.053189 | -0.0253 | -0.15106 | 0.087283 | -0.35091 | -0.37222 | -0.04618 |
| **Seeks adventure** | -0.16789 | 0.137752 | 0.283777 | -0.18571 | -0.36322 | -0.01005 | -0.34331 | 0.298874 | 0.329174 | -0.0172 |
| **Political self-definition** | -0.05615 | 0.118023 | -0.36814 | 0.067603 | -0.11696 | -0.17885 | -0.01442 | -0.05194 | 0.148034 | 0.034592 |
| **State of health** | -0.08855 | -0.06946 | -0.16685 | -0.1454 | 0.113497 | -0.27642 | -0.28803 | -0.27062 | 0.125566 | 0.067676 |
| **Income status** | 0.059041 | 0.212652 | 0.066907 | 0.023463 | 0.121706 | -0.06674 | 0.056674 | 0.163691 | 0.001424 | 0.007827 |
| **Age** | -0.05693 | 0.122645 | 0.025905 | 0.331404 | 0.139036 | 0.342748 | 0.356405 | 0.32575 | -0.24429 | -0.10359 |
| **Level of education** | -0.2031 | -0.09549 | -0.0798 | 0.046083 | 0.163769 | -0.09661 | 0.025078 | -0.09528 | -0.17002 | -0.00912 |
| **Lending** | -0.03998 | -0.02698 | 0.135182 | 0.013881 | -0.10247 | -0.04586 | -0.05631 | 0.06551 | 0.023412 | -0.00851 |
| **Family** | -0.40197 | -0.33583 | 0.237929 | 0.133182 | -0.12553 | 0.021887 | 0.236093 | 0.043445 | 0.258831 | -0.07356 |

* 1. PC Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (674x30)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -1.9256 | -0.617 | -0.0499 | 0.4432 | 3.1936 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| (Intercept) | -1.53E-16 | 3.44E-02 | 0 | 1 |  |
| **PC1** | 6.44E-02 | 1.59E-02 | 4.044 | 5.89E-05 | \*\*\* |
| **PC2** | 1.97E-01 | 1.89E-02 | 10.4 | < 2e-16 | \*\*\* |
| **PC3** | -2.12E-02 | 2.28E-02 | -0.93 | 0.35251 |  |
| **PC4** | 2.97E-02 | 2.61E-02 | 1.136 | 0.25623 |  |
| **PC5** | -8.03E-02 | 3.03E-02 | -2.651 | 0.00823 | \*\* |
| **PC6** | -6.32E-02 | 3.13E-02 | -2.022 | 0.0436 | \* |
| **PC7** | -6.56E-02 | 3.27E-02 | -2.008 | 0.04507 | \* |
| **PC8** | 1.57E-01 | 3.37E-02 | 4.668 | 3.71E-06 | \*\*\* |
| **PC9** | 5.12E-02 | 3.48E-02 | 1.469 | 0.14223 |  |
| **PC10** | -1.14E-02 | 3.54E-02 | -0.321 | 0.74809 |  |
| **PC11** | 7.21E-02 | 3.68E-02 | 1.963 | 0.0501 | . |
| **PC12** | 7.07E-02 | 3.75E-02 | 1.887 | 0.05955 | . |
| **PC13** | -6.50E-02 | 3.97E-02 | -1.637 | 0.10215 |  |
| **PC14** | 4.04E-02 | 4.00E-02 | 1.009 | 0.31322 |  |
| **PC15** | 4.71E-02 | 4.11E-02 | 1.147 | 0.25163 |  |
| **PC16** | -6.88E-02 | 4.16E-02 | -1.654 | 0.09852 | . |
| **PC17** | -9.19E-02 | 4.18E-02 | -2.197 | 0.0284 | \* |
| **PC18** | 1.09E-02 | 4.30E-02 | 0.252 | 0.80089 |  |
| **PC19** | -8.30E-02 | 4.37E-02 | -1.9 | 0.05794 | . |
| **PC20** | 3.31E-02 | 4.43E-02 | 0.747 | 0.45562 |  |
| **PC21** | 9.21E-02 | 4.48E-02 | 2.056 | 0.04016 | \* |
| **PC22** | -1.80E-02 | 4.61E-02 | -0.39 | 0.69684 |  |
| **PC23** | 6.63E-02 | 4.80E-02 | 1.381 | 0.16766 |  |
| **PC24** | -1.78E-02 | 4.88E-02 | -0.364 | 0.71564 |  |
| **PC25** | -4.23E-02 | 5.17E-02 | -0.818 | 0.41369 |  |
| **PC26** | -7.53E-02 | 5.30E-02 | -1.42 | 0.15605 |  |
| **PC27** | -5.78E-02 | 5.55E-02 | -1.041 | 0.29835 |  |
| **PC28** | 1.52E-02 | 5.83E-02 | 0.261 | 0.79434 |  |
| **PC29** | 1.28E-02 | 5.97E-02 | 0.215 | 0.83019 |  |
| **PC30** | 1.41E-02 | 8.51E-02 | 0.166 | 0.86827 |  |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.8933 on 643 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.2376, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2021

F-statistic: 6.681 on 30 and 643 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

* 1. **Regression of variables with loadings (≥ 0,30) which belong to statistically significant PC**
     1. Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (674x18)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -2.2999 | -0.6227 | -0.072 | 0.4231 | 3.3377 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| **(Intercept)** | -0.81817 | 0.334233 | -2.448 | 0.01463 | \* |
| **Security** | 0.096333 | 0.045275 | 2.128 | 0.033732 | \* |
| **Inequality and the State** | -0.02374 | 0.039687 | -0.598 | 0.549921 |  |
| **Tradition** | 0.134575 | 0.040571 | 3.317 | 0.00096 | \*\*\* |
| **Acknowledgment of external values** | 0.050907 | 0.029498 | 1.726 | 0.08486 | . |
| **The role of migrants** | 0.04139 | 0.047791 | 0.866 | 0.386769 |  |
| **Role of state** | -0.0571 | 0.032132 | -1.777 | 0.076052 | . |
| **Cultural change** | -0.0242 | 0.018375 | -1.317 | 0.188265 |  |
| **Altruism** | 0.00757 | 0.04254 | 0.178 | 0.858825 |  |
| **Environment** | 0.021727 | 0.040487 | 0.537 | 0.591693 |  |
| **Trust** | -0.05626 | 0.016669 | -3.375 | 0.000781 | \*\*\* |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.110135 | 0.026998 | 4.079 | 5.07E-05 | \*\*\* |
| **Successful** | -0.01089 | 0.032325 | -0.337 | 0.736306 |  |
| **Seeks adventure** | 0.012548 | 0.029729 | 0.422 | 0.673092 |  |
| **Income status** | -0.00541 | 0.01157 | -0.467 | 0.640327 |  |
| **Age** | -0.08578 | 0.025664 | -3.342 | 0.000878 | \*\*\* |
| **Level of education** | 0.003698 | 0.023103 | 0.16 | 0.872873 |  |
| **Lending** | 0.059264 | 0.036063 | 1.643 | 0.10079 |  |
| **Family** | 0.204575 | 0.047587 | 4.299 | 1.98E-05 | \*\*\* |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.9067 on 655 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.1999, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1779

F-statistic: 9.09 on 18 and 655 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

* + 1. Regression Social Identity with depended variable Compliance (674x6)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Residuals** | | | | |
| Min | 1Q | Median | 3Q | Max |
| -2.3343 | -0.6557 | -0.0995 | 0.4497 | 3.4211 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficients** | | | | | |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>|t|)** |  |
| **(Intercept)** | -0.56812 | 0.18395 | -3.088 | 0.002096 | \*\* |
| **Security** | 0.08648 | 0.0433 | 1.997 | 0.046238 | \* |
| **Tradition** | 0.12726 | 0.03794 | 3.354 | 0.00084 | \*\*\* |
| **Trust** | -0.05501 | 0.01639 | -3.357 | 0.000833 | \*\*\* |
| **Motive for wealth accumulation** | 0.10409 | 0.0248 | 4.198 | 3.06E-05 | \*\*\* |
| **Age** | -0.08569 | 0.02313 | -3.704 | 0.000229 | \*\*\* |
| **Family** | 0.2005 | 0.04683 | 4.281 | 2.13E-05 | \*\*\* |

Signif. codes: 0 ‘\*\*\*’ 0.001 ‘\*\*’ 0.01 ‘\*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Residual standard error: 0.9081 on 667 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.1828, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1754

F-statistic: 24.86 on 6 and 667 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

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