**“Speeding Behaviour and Speed Regulation and Enforcement”**

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The decision to exceed the speed limit is the result of a complex interplay between individual preferences and the trade-off between of various attributes. A higher travelling speed allows for time savings, economic advantages and easier access to people and goods. Some advantages are then associated with this choice (Carnis and Mignot, 2023). Furthermore, it is well documented that excessive speeding is associated with an increased risk of road traffic accidents, resulting in fatalities and injuries (Elvik, 2009).

The advantages are primarily individualistic in nature, whereas the costs are borne by a third party. The necessity for corrective measures is thus underscored by the existence of external effects. Insurance mechanisms may be employed by adjusting the insurance premium in accordance with the driver's crash record, while certain liability regulations may be implemented to determine compensation for victims (Cooter and Ulen, 2004). An alternative solution would be to call for a public response to address the negative externalities.

This contribution examines various facets of the public response to speeding behaviour. The following three research outcomes illustrate the various interests at stake with regard to the public regulatory mechanism for curbing speeding behaviour in France.

Firstly, the public response may entail the establishment of a novel and appropriate speed limit. The implementation of a new speed limit represents a political decision with significant economic implications. First and foremost, a pivotal concern pertains to the efficacy of the measure itself, that is to say, its capacity to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries. Carnis and Garcia (2024) demonstrate that reducing the speed limit can significantly reduce road fatalities as it was proved with the implementation of the 80 km/h speed limit in the French counties. This finding aligns with the scientific literature. From a law and economics perspective, this result illustrates the potential for modifying driver behaviour through changes to the highway code and speed limit, while maintaining consistent speed enforcement. For some drivers, adhering to the rule is sufficiently important to influence expected behaviours and speeding choices.

Secondly, the implementation of the rule could yield favourable outcomes. Becker and Ehrlich demonstrated in their seminal works that an economic approach could be applied to the study of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1996). A comparable approach could be employed in the enforcement of speed regulations. Carnis and Blais (2013) demonstrated through econometric modelling that more rigorous enforcement of speed limits is associated with a significant reduction in injuries and accidents. The implementation of a speed camera programme in France facilitates the detection of speed offenders in a non-discriminatory manner. The designation of a speed offender is based solely on the infraction of exceeding the permitted speed limit, irrespective of the offender's race, age, or nationality.

Thirdly, the act of observing or contravening the speed regulation is also contingent upon individual preferences. This is the result of idiosyncratic preferences regarding the legitimacy of the rule and the driver's personal preferences regarding the fair enforcement of the rule (Cestac and Carnis, 2024). Furthermore, the enforcement of the rule depends on the quality of the institution (Harris, 1970) and the protection it provides to road users.

The aforementioned three perspectives on speed regulation demonstrate that a multitude of combinations are feasible with regard to legal norms, enforcement, supervision, and punishment. These combinations are not isolated phenomena; they are shaped by a larger framework that encompasses the manner in which laws are defined and the individuals who comprise society.

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